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Comment
Repetitive Post-Conviction Petitions
Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:
Can the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Tame the "Monster"?
I. INTRODUCTION
Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA or Act)' is
a potent weapon for attacking "[criminal] convictions obtained
and sentences imposed without due process of law." 2 The PCHA
encompasses all collateral remedies3 previously available to per-
sons convicted in the courts of Pennsylvania, including habeas
corpus' and coram nobis.5
The Act is an escape hatch from an unconstitutional conviction
and, as such, is designed to be readily accessible to anyone with
a worthy claim for collateral relief.' But easy access invites
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1180-1 to -10 §§ 1180-12 to -14 (Purdon Supp.
1981). The 1981 Purdon supplement indicates that the PCHA has been repealed
effective June 27, 1981. However, 1981 Pa. Laws 41 § 2, enacted on June 26,
1981 delayed the repeal date to June 26, 1982. The Post Conviction Hearing Act
is implemented by rules set forth in PA. R. CRIM. P., Rules 1501-6 (Purdon
Supp. 1981).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-2 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-3 (Purdon Supp. 1981). The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has explained that the PCHA "is designed to give a defendant
convicted of crime a final opportunity [through a separate legal action] to vin-
dicate his constitutional right to due process of law." Commonwealth v.
Rightnour, 469 Pa. 107, 110, 364 A.2d 927, 928 (1976). The supreme court has
held that the PCHA does not abolish the common law remedies of habeas cor-
pus or coram nobis, see infra note 5, but rather provides a well-defined pro-
cedure for seeking collateral relief. Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 446 Pa. 35, 285
A.2d 465 (1971). See also Moss v. Pennsylvania, 257 F.Supp. 643 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
4. For a discussion of the history of the "Great Writ"; habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-426 (1963).
5. The writ of error coram nobis is a common-law procedural tool designed
to correct errors of fact, not law. It is used to bring facts before a court which,
if known at the time of judgment, would have changed the outcome of an
earlier proceeding. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mangini, 478 Pa. 147, 163, 386
A.2d 482, 490 (1978).
6. A convicted person invokes the PCHA by completing a simple petition,
see PA. R. CRIM. P. R. 1501 (Purdon Supp. 1981), and filing it with the clerk of
237
238 Duquesne Law Review [Vol. 20:237
abuse by those who seek to upset constitutional convictions. And
so, the PCHA includes provisions that discourage frivolous and
repetitive petitions for relief.' The most important of these em-
powers a PCHA court 8 to summarily dismiss any petition that
raises issues that have been finally litigated or waived.9 An issue
is waived under the PCHA if the petitioner could have raised it
at an earlier stage in the proceedings against him, but knowingly
and understandingly failed to do so.'0 Waiver is an absolute bar
the trial court, see PA. R. CRIM. P., R. 1502 (Purdon Supp. 1981). See also infra
note 8. Although most PCHA petitioners are either imprisoned, on parole, or on
probation, the PCHA can be used to attack a conviction after a sentence has
been satisfied if there are "collateral criminal consequences," ie., if the convic-
tion or sentence directly affects a subsequent criminal or civil proceeding. Com-
monwealth v. Doria, 232 Pa. Super. 439, 442, 335 A.2d 472, 473 (1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 468 Pa. 534, 364 A.2d 322 (1976).
7. See infra note 9 and text accompanying notes 31-40.
8. The "PCHA court," ie., the court that receives the petition and grants
or refuses collateral relief, is the trial court in which the petitioner was con-
victed. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-5 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
9. This power is created by the interaction of four provisions of the
PCHA: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-3(d) (Purdon Supp. 1981) provides that a
petitioner, to be eligible for relief, must prove "[tihat the error resulting in his
conviction and sentence has not been finally litigated or waived." Section
1180-4(a) provides that an issue is finally litigated under the PCHA if:
1. It has been raised in the trial court, the trial court has ruled on the
merits of the issue and the petitioner has knowingly and understandingly
failed to appeal the trial court's ruling; or
2. The Superior Court . . . has ruled on the merits of the issue and the
petitioner has knowingly and understandingly failed to avail himself of
further appeals; or
3. The [Pennsylvania) Supreme Court ... has ruled on the merits of the
issue.
Id. Section 1180-4(b) provides that an issue is waived under the PCHA if:
1. The petitioner knowingly and understandingly failed to raise it and it
could have been raised before the trial, at the trial, on appeal .... or in
any other proceeding actually conducted [including a prior PCHA pro-
ceeding) ... ; and
2. The petitioner is unable to prove the existence of extraordinary cir-
cumstances to justify his failure to raise the issue.
Id. Section 1180-9 provides that:
If a petition alleges facts that if proven would entitle the petitioner to
relief, the court shall grant a hearing .... However, the court may deny a
hearing if the petitioner's claim is patently frivolous and is without a
trace of support either in the record or from other evidence submitted by
the petitioner. The court may also deny a hearing on a specific question of
fact when a full and fair evidentiary hearing upon that question was held
at the original trial or at any later proceeding.
Id. See also infra note 34.
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-4(b)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1981). See supra
note 9.
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to relief unless a petitioner can prove that "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" justify his failure to have raised the issue earlier."
The PCHA's unambiguous waiver rule should make it almost
impossible for a second or third PCHA petition to "succeed." 1
But a statistical analysis 3 of PCHA appeals reaching the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court suggests that filing repetitive PCHA pe-
titions can be a fairly productive endeavor. Between March 1, 1966
(the date the PCHA went into effect) and September 21, 1980, the
supreme court decided more than 300 appeals dealing with the in-
terpretation and application of the PCHA."' More than forty of
the appeals-about fourteen percent-were subsequent-petition
appeals, ie., the petitioner had filed one or more previous PCHA
petitions.15 In eighteen of these subsequent-petition appeals the
appellants received further PCHA proceedings. 6 Simply put,
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-4(b)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1981). See supra
note 9.
12. In this Comment, a "successful" subsequent PCHA petition is one that
survives the gauntlet of statutory bars and prohibitions against successive peti-
tions, and generates further PCHA proceedings for the petitioner-even if
those proceedings do not ultimately achieve any collateral relief for the peti-
tioner.
13. The statistical analyses discussed in the text were performed on a
"LEXIS" computer-based information retrieval system, a service of Mead Data
Central, New York, N.Y. The various "search requests" used by the author are
reproduced infra in notes 14-16 and 91-92, should the reader wish to duplicate
the searches. As with all computer-library studies, there is a possibility that
some pertinent cases have been ignored, or that inappropriate cases have been
included. Thus, the statistics presented should be interpreted as indicative of
trends, rather than as precise tallies.
14. The following LEXIS search request was used to obtain this informa-
tion: (PCHA OR P.C.H.A. OR POST PRE13 CONVICTION) AND (§ 1180!) AND
DATE BEF SEPTEMBER 22, 1980). A quick scan of these cases revealed that
most of the appellants had either been found guilty of murder or had pleaded
guilty to murder; their PCHA appeals reached the high court as appeals of
right when their PCHA courts refused to grant hearings, or otherwise denied
relief. Under the old Rules of Court, the supreme court had original jurisdiction
for all felonious homicide appeals from the courts of common pleas. See 17 P.S.
§ 211.202 (repealed). This rule was modified by 1980 P.L. 686, No. 137, § 1, effec-
tive on November 23, 1980, to shift original appellate jurisdiction for murder
appeals to the superior court. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 722, 742 (Purdon
1981). Thus, future PCHA appeals will reach the supreme court only on grants
of allocatur.
15. The LEXIS "search request", in supra note 14, was modified by adding
the following "second level": AND (SECOND OR THIRD OR FOURTH OR
FIFTH OR SIXTH) PRE/4 PETITION).
16. The modified LEXIS "search request", in supra note 15, was further
modified by adding the following "third level": AND (VACAT! OR REVERS!)
PRE/4 REMAND!.
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some forty percent of the subsequent-petition appeals to the su-
preme court were "successful." Most of the successful subse-
quent-petition appeals involved issues related, either directly or
indirectly, to the right to be represented by effective counsel."7
On September 22, 1980, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court hand-
ed down a decision that seems to have made these good odds
even better. In Commonwealth v. Watlington,"8 the court held
that the issues raised in the appellant's second PCHA petition
had not been finally litigated or waived because he alleged that
all of his prior counsel were ineffective.19 The plurality accepted
these allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in lieu of a
showing of "extraordinary circumstances," and remanded the
case for further proceedings.
Watlington seems to imply that the PCHA's waiver rule is vul-
17. Some "successful" subsequent-petition appeals involved a finding by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the petitioner had not received sufficient
representation by an attorney during some stage of the proceedings against
him, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Haywood, 441 Pa. 177, 272 A.2d 727 (1971). In
such cases, the petitioner's right to be represented by counsel was directly
violated. Other cases involved a petitioner's allegations of attorney error by the
petitioner that were sustained by the supreme court, see, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Watlington, 491 Pa. 241, 420 A.2d 431 (1980), see infra notes 18-24 and accom-
panying text. The rubric "indirect" applied to these violations indicates that the
essential issues they present concern the quality of representation, rather than
the classic constitutional issue of whether or not an attorney was present at the
appropriate time. For an. excellent discussion of the challenges of analyzing inef-
fective criminal counsel see Strazzella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims: New Uses, New Problems, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 443 (1977).
18. 491 Pa. 241, 420 A.2d 431 (1980). Justice O'Brien wrote the opinion of the
court, in which Justices Roberts and Nix joined. Justice Larsen wrote a con-
curring opinion, in which Chief Justice Eagen joined. Justice Flaherty, joined by
Justice Kauffman, dissented.
19. The issues in question concerned the jury charge at Watlington's
original trial. Watlington alleged that his trial counsel should have: (1) objected
to the trial court's charges on reasonable doubt; (2) objected to the trial court's
charges that a prosecution witness may have been an accomplice; and (3) ob-
jected to the trial court's continuous highlighting in its charge that the murder
occurred during an attempted robbery. 491 Pa. at 243, 420 A.2d at 432. None of
these objections had been made at the trial, or raised at the direct appeal or in
Watlington's first PCHA petition. Id. at 244, 420 A.2d at 433. In his pro se
second PCHA petition, Watlington claimed that his retained trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the charge, that his court-appointed direct ap-
peal counsel was ineffective for failing to allege the ineffectiveness of the trial
counsel, and that the court-appointed counsel who helped prepare his first
PCHA petition was ineffective for failing to allege the ineffectiveness of his
direct-appeal counsel. Id. at 243, 420 A.2d at 432.
20. Id. at 245-46, 420 A.2d at 433-44.
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nerable to a well-crafted allegation of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Justice Flaherty, in a vigorous dissent,' argued that the
holding means no criminal conviction will ever become final, be-
cause subsequent counsel can always generate new litigation by
alleging the ineffectiveness of his predecessor. He warned that
Watlington will encourage the filing of endless PCHA petitions,23
and he urged the supreme court to recognize that it had inadver-
tently created a monster of inefficiency and judicial wastefulness
in its past interpretations of the PCHA. '
Less than ten months later the supreme court came face to
face with the "monster" in Commonwealth v. Alexander,25 when
it affirmed the PCHA court's dismissal of the appellant's sixth
PCHA petition-a petition alleging that three prior counsel were
ineffective." Although the plurality opinion27 acknowledged that
the drafters of the PCHA did not intend a mere assertion of inef-
fective counsel to be elevated to the status of "extraordinary cir-
cumstances,"28 the supreme court was not ready to slay the
"monster" by overruling Watlington and its ancestors.' Instead,
the plurality tried to tame it by offering lower courts a series of
guidelines for evaluating subsequent PCHA petitions. 0
This comment explores the heritage of the "monster," dis-
cusses the utility of the Alexander guidelines, and concludes that
the best way to ensure equitable collateral review and finality of
constitutional convictions is to amend the PCHA to incorporate a
specific procedure for dealing with a subsequent petition that
21. Id. at 246, 420 A.2d at 434 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 250, 420 A.2d at 436 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). Much of the same
argument was made by Judge Hoffman of the superior court in his concurring
opinion in Commonwealth v. Jackson. 239 Pa. Super. 121, 143-44, 362 A.2d 324,
336 (1976) (Hoffman, J., concurring).
23. 491 Pa. at 249, 420 A.2d at 435 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
24. Id.
25. 495 Pa. 26, 432 A.2d 182 (1981).
26. Id. at 29, 432 A.2d at 188.
27. The case was heard by a six-justice court. Justice Larsen wrote the
opinion of the court. Chief Justice O'Brien and Justice Roberts concurred in the
result. Justice Nix filed a concurring opinion. Justice Flaherty, joined by
Justice Kauffman, filed another concurring opinion.
28. 495 Pa. at 33, 432 A.2d at 185.
29. Many of the ancestors of Watlington are discussed in this Comment.
See infra text at section II.
30. 495 Pa. at 36-38, 432 A.2d at 186-88. See infra text accompanying notes
197-202.
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alleges the ineffective assistance of a counsel who served at an
earlier stage. Under the proposed procedure, a PCHA court will
be empowered to determine, in a summary proceeding, whether
the counsel who served immediately after the challenged at-
torney investigated the actions of the challenged attorney, and
whether he reasonably concluded that the challenged attorney
had acted in his client's best interest. If such an investigation
has been made, and if the investigation led to a reasonable con-
clusion that the challenged attorney had acted in his client's best
interests, the PCHA court can summarily dismiss the petitioner's
claim of ineffective counsel.
II. THE BREEDING GROUNDS OF THE "MONSTER"
A. The PCHA's Defenses Against Frivolous and Repetitive Petitions
The drafters of the PCHA recognized that a petitioner will
often need a formal evidentiary hearing to establish his claim.
Thus, a PCHA court is required to grant a hearing if a petition
alleges facts which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to re-
lief."' The PCHA court can, however, deny any evidentiary hear-
ing, ie., summarily dismiss a petition,"2 if the claim is "patently
frivolous and ... without a trace of support either in the record
or from other evidence submitted by the petitioner."33 This is the
PCHA's first line of defense against frivolous petitions. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has interpreted the provision to
mean that the right to a PCHA hearing is not absolute.34
The PCHA's second line of defense is its waiver rule.3 5 A peti-
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-9 (Purdon Supp. 1981). The supreme
court has said: "If there be any single proposition of law in the ... field of post
conviction remedies so well established that it rates the title 'horn book' it is
that a [PCHA] petition .. .must not be dismissed without an evidentiary hear-
ing if it alleges facts which, if true, would entitle petitioner to relief .... [S]ec-
tion 9 of [the PCHA] merely codifies prior habeas corpus law." Commonwealth
v. Johnson, 431 Pa. 522, 532, 246 A.2d 345, 351 (1968).
32. See supra note 9.
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-9 (Purdon Supp. 1981). The PCHA doesn't
define "frivolous." A dictionary definition is: "[U]nworthy of serious attention;
insignificant; trivial; . . . [m]arked by flippancy; silly or gay." AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 528 (W. Morris ed. 1978).
34. Commonwealth v. Sherard, 483 Pa. 183, 187 394 A.2d 971, 974 (1978).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-4(b) (Purdon Supp. 1981). In Commonwealth
v. Williams, 437 Pa. 526, 263 A.2d 127 (1970), the supreme court held that a PCHA
hearing is not required, i.e., a petition can be summarily dismissed, if the issues it
presents have been waived. Id. at 528, 263 A.2d at 128.
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tioner who intentionally files a frivolous petition might be able to
concoct an allegation that passes muster."8 But the issues he can
raise will almost certainly have been finally litigated or waived
in earlier proceedings.37 The PCHA demands affirmative proof of
"extraordinary circumstances" to justify a waiver.38 The author
of a frivolous petition will not, of course, have legitimate proof.
A person filing a second or subsequent petition faces an even
more difficult challenge under the statute. The PCHA explicitly
states that a convicted person is entitled to file one petition that
sets forth all grounds for relief then available.39 Consequently, a
repetitive petition can be summarily dismissed by a PCHA court
unless it alleges grounds for relief that were not previously
available, are not frivolous, and have not been finally litigated or
waived. This tightly woven mesh of statutory provisions is, at
least in theory, an impenetrable barrier against all but the few
extraordinary subsequent petitions that have merit.0
B. Subsequent-Petition Appeals to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
1. The Court's Early Decisions
It is unfair to say that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
carved an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel loophole -into the
PCHA's protective shield against subsequent petitions.' On the
36. Finding a suitable allegation is not difficult, as the facts in Alexander,
supra note 25, reveal. Alexander's sixth PCHA petition alleged, inter alia, that
his "arrest was invalid as he was not arraigned until nine hours after his
custody and was not given an opportunity to speak to his attorney during this
time." - Pa. at - 432 A.2d at 183. The PCHA court did not dismiss this
allegation as "patently frivolous," but instead argued that it had been waived. Id.
37. This statement is, of course, a tautology. A petitioner with no fair
claim to PCHA relief will by necessity be forced to resurrect one or more
errors that were either alleged earlier (and thus finally litigated), or ignored
earlier (and thus, by definition, waived).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-4(b)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
39. Id. § 1180-5(4)(b). -
40. The supreme court has not construed the PCHA's express one-petition
provision, see infra note 39 and accompanying text, as an absolute bar to subse-
quent petitions. In Alexander, for example, the plurality called this provision
"the paramount procedural feature of the PCHA," but still left a PCHA court
the discretion to consider a subsequent petition. 495 Pa. at 39, 432 A.2d at 188.
Thus, the court has been willing to acknowledge the possibility that successive
petitions will, on occasion, be necessary to correct due process errors in
criminal proceedings.
41. See infra text at section II(A).
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other hand, a line of PCHA-appeal decisions spanning more than
a decade has given a special status to the claim of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel in all PCHA petitions. It is now something
more than an "ordinary" reviewable constitutional issue, 2 yet
something less than a magic phrase that unlocks the gates of the
waiver rule. This special status arose because the supreme court
was forced to reconcile the express prohibitions of the waiver
rule with the reality that criminal defense attorneys make mis-
takes that prejudice their clients' interests.43
Coincidentally, the first PCHA appeal heard by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court involved a second request for collateral
relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In Com-
monwealth ex rel Bordner v. Russell," the court held that the
petitioner was entitled to a PCHA hearing even though he had
previously filed, then withdrawn, a petition for habeas corpus. 5
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-3(c) (Purdon Supp. 1981) lists 12
categories of errors cognizable under the PCHA.:
1. The introduction of evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful ar-
rest;
2. The introduction of evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search
and seizure;
3. The introduction of a coerced confession into evidence;
4. The introduction' into evidence of a statement obtained in the
absence of counsel at a time when representation is constitutionally re-
quired;
5. The infringement of . . . [petitioners] privilege against self-
incrimination under either Federal or State law;
6. The denial of... [petitioner's] constitutional right to representation
by competent counsel;
7. A plea of guilty unlawfully induced;
8. The unconstitutional suppression of evidence by the State;
9. The unconstitutional use by the State of perjured testimony;
10. The obstruction by State officials of petitioner's right of appeal.
11. [Petitioner's] . . . being twice placed in jeopardy.
12. The abridgment in any other way of any right guaranteed by the
constitution or laws of this State or the constitution or laws of the United
States, including a right that was not recognized at the time of the trial if
the constitution requires retrospective application or that right.
Id. The thirteenth provision in the cited section is a restatement of the re-
quirements for a writ of corum nobus, see supra note 5.
43. See e.g. infra text accompanying notes 77-82.
44. 422 Pa. 365, 221 A.2d 177 (1966).
45. Id. at 368-69, 221 A.2d at 179. The court noted that under traditional
common law, the dismissal of a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus was not
res judicata; courts were bound to consider subsequent petitions unless they
found an "abuse of the writ" in repeated requests for relief. Id. at 370, 221 A.2d
at 180. In two later cases involving habeas petitions that had actually been
[Vol. 20:237
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The Bordner court did not attach any special significance to the
claim of ineffective counsel; it was merely the issue raised in the
appellant's PCHA petition." The court, however, took note of the
potential problem of repetitive petitions and affirmed the general
principle that a PCHA court can refuse to entertain an issue that
has been fully considered in a prior petition for relief."
Two years later, the court upheld the constitutionality of the
PCHA's waiver rule in Commonwealth v. Satchell." Satchell's
first PCHA petition led to a counseled evidentiary hearing, at
which time his claims for relief were denied. He subsequently filed
another PCHA petition, alleging a new ground for relief. The
PCHA court summarily dismissed the second petition without a
hearing or leave to amend, and Satchell appealed to the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court. 9 In a unanimous decision, the court said
that the PCHA's standard of waiver is identical to that employed
by the federal courts, ie., the court must ask whether the peti-
tioner deliberately bypassed state procedures available for the
litigation of his claim. 0 Applying this standard, the court held
that the PCHA is an available state procedure, and that a peti-
tioner's failure to raise a claim for relief in a prior PCHA peti-
tion prepared with the aid of counsel' constitutes a deliberate
bypass of state procedure, thus foreclosing later litigation of the
claim." The court remanded the case to the PCHA court with in-
structions to give Satchell the opportunity to amend his second
petition to include the reasons, if any, for his failure to raise the
new allegation in his first petition." By way of dicta, the court
reviewed by courts and then dismissed, the supreme court held that the
PCHA's waiver rules were fully retroactive. This meant that issues not raised
in a habeas petition filed before the effective date of the PCHA were waived.
See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 433 Pa. 582, 252 A.2d 641 (1969); Com-
monwealth v. Henderson, 433 Pa. 585, 253 A.2d 109 (1969). However, the
supreme court subsequently overruled these cases in Commonwealth v. Cannon,
442 Pa. 339, 275 A.2d 293 (1971).
46. 422 Pa. at 367-68, 221 A.2d at 178.
47. Id. at 369-70, 221 A.2d at 179.
48. 430 Pa. 443, 243 A.2d 381 (1968).
49. Id. at 445, 243 A.2d at 382.
50. Id. at 447, 243 A.2d at 383.
51. The supreme court made special note of the fact that Satchell was
represented by counsel during the proceeding connected with his first petition.
Id. at 447-48, 243 A.2d at 383. See infra text accompanying note 54.
52. Id. at 448, 243 A.2d at 383.
53. Id. at 451, 243 A.2d at 384.
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stated: "[W]e believe Pennsylvania can rest upon the presump-
tion that post conviction counsel informed his client of all the
available grounds of attack.""4
On the same day Satchell was decided, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court announced its decision in Commonwealth v. Alston.55
Alston reached the high court on allocatur after the dismissal of
Alston's second PCHA petition had been affirmed by the superior
court." The Alston majority addressed, as a peripheral issue, 7
the appellant's claim that his first PCHA counsel had been inef-
fective." Although the court did not find that Alston's right to
effective post conviction counsel was identical to his right to ef-
fective trial counsel,59 it held that the performance of Alston's
first PCHA counsel met the effectiveness standard set forth in
Commonwealth ex rel Washington v. Maroney: 60 "[C]ounsel's
assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once ... [the court
is] able to conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel
had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's in-
terests."6 The Alston court clearly had to examine and consider
the record of the first PCHA proceeding to reach its conclusion.
Thus, as early as 1968 the supreme court was willing to entertain
the allegation by a subsequent PCHA counsel that his predecessor
was ineffective.62
54. Id. at 449, 243 A.2d at 384. The supreme court cited Satchell six months
later in Commonwealth v. Black, 433 Pa. 150, 249 A.2d 561 (1969), a second peti-
tion appeal in which one of the grounds for relief alleged by the petitioner was in-
effective assistance of counsel at trial. The court held that his claims had been
"finally litigated" by his failure to raise them at the first PCHA hearing. Id. at
152, 249 A.2d at 562. The supreme court might have chosen to freeze its inter-
pretation of the PCHA's waiver rule at this point. For examples of two state
supreme courts who have adopted this approach in construing their states' post-
conviction remedy statutes, see Mottram v. Maine, 263 A.2d 715 (1970) and
People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 243, 519 P.2d 945 (1974).
55. 430 Pa. 471, 243 A.2d 404 (1968).
56. Id. at 473, 243 A.2d at 406.
57. The central issues addressed by the Alston court were whether a key
Commonwealth witness had committed perjury and whether afterdiscovered
evidence justified a new trial. Id. at 473-74, 243 A.2d at 406.
58. Id. at 475, 243 A.2d at 407.
59. Id.
60. 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).
61. Id. at 604, 235 A.2d at 352.
62. This, of course, was one of the concerns Justice Flaherty voiced in his
Watlington dissent. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The supreme
court's approach in Alston seems inconsitent with the statement in Satchell to
the effect that Pennsylvania can rest upon the presumption that post conviction
[Vol. 20:237
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Several months later, the court decided Commonwealth v. Sey-
mour, a subsequent-petition appeal that involved both the alleg-
ed ineffectiveness of a trial counsel," and an inappropriate
course of conduct by the court-appointed counsel at the peti-
tioner's first PCHA proceeding. The case reveals the difficulty of
applying the PCHA's statutory bars in cases involving actual or
alleged attorney error. After Seymour filed his first PCHA peti-
tion, the PCHA court appointed an attorney to assist Seymour,
and then requested that the attorney prepare a report on the
merits of Seymour's claim. 5 The report recommended the petition
be summarily dismissed, and the PCHA court agreed. Instead
of appealing the dismissal, Seymour filed a second PCHA peti-
tion . The PCHA court denied it on the grounds that it was a
repetition of his first petition, and the superior court affirmed.68
In a per curiam opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
jected the role of a PCHA counsel as an adjunct to the PCHA
court when it screens petitions. The supreme court said the
PCHA contemplates that a petitioner will be represented in a
full and complete sense by an independent attorney. 9 The court
concluded that because Seymour had not received such represen-
tation at his first PCHA proceedings, none of the issues raised in
the first petition had been finally litigated." Thus, the court was
able to review the allegations in Seymour's second PCHA peti-
tion. It held that the second petition did allege a fact which, if
counsel informed his client of all the available grounds of attack. See supra note
54 and accompanying text.
63. 436 Pa. 159, 259 A.2d 676 (1969).
64. Id. at 161, 259 A.2d at 677. Seymour pled guilty to charges of statutory
rape and abusing a woman child. In his first PCHA petition, he alleged that his
trial counsel had not advised him of his right to appeal and had improperly ad-
vised him of the elements of the offense. Id. at 161-62, 259 A.2d at 677. This
petition was subsequently summarily dismissed by the PCHA court. See infra
text accompanying notes 65-66. The supreme court examined both allegations
when it considered the merits of Seymour's second PCHA application. See infra
notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
65. Id. at 161, 259 A.2d at 677.
66. Id., 259 A.2d at 677.
67. Id., 259 A.2d at 677.
68. Id. at 161-62, 259 A.2d at 677.
69. Id. at 161, 259 A.2d at 677.
70. Id., 259 A.2d at 677. The term "finally litigated" is appropriate here
because the issues had been raised in a previous collateral proceeding. See
supra note 9 for the PCHA's definition of the term.
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proven, would entitle him to relief, and granted Seymour an
evidentiary hearing.7 1
It is worth noting that the Seymour court did not try to cir-
cumvent the PCHA's protective shield against subsequent peti-
tions by finding an excuse to justify Seymour's failure to appeal
the dismissal of the first petition. Instead, the court held that
the ineffective counsel issue had not been finally litigated during
the petitioner's first try for collateral relief.73 Simply put, there
was nothing to excuse. The lack of effective representation at
the first PCHA proceeding prevented the final litigation of the
claims Seymour had made.74
71. Id. at 162, 259 A.2d at 677-78. As to Seymour's first allegation, the
supreme court noted that a claim that the petitioner was denied the right to ap-
peal following a guilty plea in a case not involving a murder charge is not a
ground for post-conviction relief, since the only issues which may be raised are
properly heard in a collateral proceeding. Id. at 162, 259 A.2d at 677. The court,
however, found that Seymour's second allegation-that his trial counsel misin-
formed him as to the elements of the charge against him-did allege a fact,
which if proven, would entitle him to relief. Id., 259 A.2d at 677-78.
72. Presumably, the Seymour Court might have found, under Pa Stat.
Ann. tit. 19, § 1180-4(a)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1981) that Seymour had not knowingly
and understandingly failed to appeal the trial court's dismissal of his PCHA
petition.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
74. The supreme court followed an analogous course in Commonwealth v.
Norman, 447 Pa. 217, 285 A.2d 523 )1971). Norman filed his first PCHA petition
in 1967, which alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective because he had not
appraised Norman of his right to appeal. Before the hearing took place, Norman
asked for (and received) an indefinite continuance. In 1968, he filed a second
PCHA petition, which the PCHA court dismissed on the theory that the issue
had been finally litigated when the supreme court examined the trial record
during an earlier habeas corpus proceeding. On appeal, the supreme court cited
Commonwealth v. Cannon, 442 Pa. 339, 275 A.2d 293 (1971), as authority for not
considering the habeas corpus petition a bar to PCHA review, and held that
"the issue [whether Norman had been denied his right to appeal] was not finally
litigated." 447 Pa. at 220, 285 A.2d at 525. The supreme court based its decision
on the absence of any indication in the record that Norman had been informed,
by either the trial court or by his counsel, of his right to appeal. The petition
was remanded to the PCHA court with instructions to give the Commonwealth
"1an opportunity to introduce evidence that ... [Norman] knew both of his right
to appeal and of his right to have counsel appointed to assist him on appeal." Id.
at 222-23, 285 A.2d at 526.
Chief Justice Bell was disturbed by the majority decision. He wrote in a
colorful dissent:
Is there never to be an end to appeals by a person convicted of murder?
Furthermore, it is outrageous to let a convicted murderer, or indeed any
criminal, play fast and loose-as this appellant has done-with the
supreme court, or with any other Court. In the light of the [facts of the
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2. Commonwealth v. Wideman: An Invitation to Frivolous
Petitions Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
If the Watlington "monster" has a birthday, it is July 2, 1973.
On that date, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Common-
wealth v. Wideman,75 and created a precedent that would be cited
with approval seven years later by the Watlington plurality."6 The
facts of the case are straightforward. In 1964, Wideman's first
trial on charges of conspiracy and armed robbery ended in a
mistrial that did not meet constitutional "manifest necessity"
standards." Thus, double jeopardy had attached."8 Some two-and-
a-half years later, however, Wideman was retried, convicted, and
imprisoned." Wideman first raised the double-jeopardy issue in a
PCHA petition filed in 1970.8" The petition was dismissed by the
PCHA court, and the dismissal was affirmed by the superior
court, because Wideman's second trial counsel had not raised the
issue in post-trial motions, or in direct appeal following his con-
viction. 81
These facts posed a clear-cut dilemma for the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court. On one hand, Wideman was the victim of an ineffec-
tive attorney who had failed to raise a valid objection to double
jeopardy. On the other, Wideman had technically waived the issue
under the PCHA by not alleging double jeopardy at his earlier ap-
peal proceedings. Justice Eagan, writing for the majority, solved
the problem by invoking the "extraordinary circumstances" ex-
ception on PCHA's waiver rule.2 He held that Wideman was not
precluded from raising the double jeopardy issue in this col-
case] . . .it is . . . incomprehensible to me how this Court can remand for
another hearing. I very vigorously dissent.
447 Pa. at 227-28, 285 A.2d at 529 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
75. 453 Pa. 119, 306 A.2d 894 (1973). It should be noted that Wideman is an
appeal from the dismissal of a first PCHA petition.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 172-73.
77. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91, 288 A.2d 727 (1972).
The rule that double jeopardy attaches if a mistrial is declared, over-
defendant's objection, in the absence of "manifest necessity" was first set-forth
in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9. Wheat.) 579 (1824).
78. 453 Pa. at 122, 306 A.2d at 895.
79. Id. at 120-21, 306 A.2d at 895.
80. Id. at 123, 306 A.2d at 896. The Wideman court's opinion says nothing
about Wideman's failure to assert double jeopardy during his second trial.
81. Id. at 121-23, 306 A.2d at 895-96.
82. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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lateral proceeding because "[i]neffective assistance of counsel con-
stitutes . . . 'extraordinary circumstances' [under the PCHA]." 3
After making his sweeping statement, Justice Eagan did not
explain it further. Instead, he discussed the constitutional right
to effective counsel and described the two substantial errors
made by Wideman's attorney. Justice Eagan subsequently re-
versed the orders of both the superior court and the PCHA court
and dismissed the criminal charges against Wideman. 4
In retrospect, it can be argued that the Wideman court chose
the wrong way out of the dilemma. It could have reached the
same conclusion by following the approach implicit in Seymour,85
i.e., by holding that Wideman had not had the opportunity to
knowingly and understandingly waive the double jeopardy issue
at his earlier proceedings. If, as the Seymour court had held, the
lack of full and complete representation aborts the functioning of
the finality rule, why would not the failure of counsel to raise ob-
vious issues bar the operation of the waiver rule?"
By equating ineffective counsel with "extraordinary cir-
cumstances," Wideman sub silentio amends the PCHA. The Act
lists the denial of the right to representation by competent
counsel as one of several issues that may be raised by the PCHA
petitioner. 7 Nothing in the language of the Act suggests that a
83. 453 Pa. at 123, 306 A.2d at 896.
84. Id. at 124, 306 A.2d at 896.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 63-74.
86. Some years earlier, in Commonwealth v. Kizer, 428 Pa. 99, 236 A.2d
515 (1967), the supreme court stated: "[wie should be loathe to impose . . . [the
PCHA's] waiver provisions against a prisoner who lacked counsel's advice as to
the possible appellate procedures available." Id. at 101, 236 A.2d at 516.
Although the court was talking about a PCHA petitioner who acted without
any advice from counsel, the facts in Wideman provide a much more compelling
reason to apply this doctrine. Quite clearly, Wideman did not have the advice of
competent counsel about possible appellate procedures. Similarly, in Com-
monwealth v. Minnick, 436 Pa. 42, 258 A.2d 515 (1969), the supreme court held
that a theory of waiver cannot be predicated upon an uncounselled PCHA pro-
ceeding. In Commonwealth v. Fiero, 462 Pa. 409, 341 A.2d 448 (1975), a post-
Wideman subsequent-petition appeal, the supreme court reversed the summary
dismissal of the appellant's second pro se PCHA petition. The Fiero court af-
firmed the principle stated in Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 427 Pa. 395, 235 A.2d
148 (1967), that a PCHA petition can not be summarily dismissed if it is devoid
of any evidence of meaningful participation by counsel. The Fiero court held
that in these circumstances the PCHA's waiver rule does not apply. 462 Pa. at
412, 341 A.2d t 449.
87. See supra note 42; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-3(c)(6) (Purdon Supp.
1981).
[Vol. 20:237
Post-Conviction Petitions
claim of ineffective counsel is immune to the PCHA's finally
litigated or waived rule. The Wideman court, however, effectively
granted such immunity when it held that ineffective assistance of
counsel excused the waiver of Wideman's double jeopardy claim
at earlier proceedings." This can be seen from the simple obser-
vation that Wideman's claims of ineffective counsel and double
jeopardy arose at the same time. 9 Wideman technically waived his
claim of ineffective counsel at the same time he waived his objec-
tion to double jeopardy, i.e., in post-trial motions or on direct ap-
peal following his conviction.9"
Wideman is a watershed decision in that it seems to have made
ineffective counsel a much more attractive PCHA claim. During
the seven years before Wideman, only eleven percent of all PCHA
appeals reaching the Pennsylvania Supreme Court alleged ineffec-
tive assistance of prior counsel.' During the eight years after
Wideman, the figure jumped to fifty-one percent"-despite the
deterrent effect of Commonwealth v. Dancer,93 a 1975 Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court decision that requires most claims of inef-
fective trial counsel to be made during the direct appeal, rather
than at the first PCHA proceeding. 4
Some of these increases can be attributed to Commonwealth v.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
89. The gravemen of the ineffectiveness claim is that Wideman's second
trial counsel ignored an issue, i.e., double jeopardy, that "stood out on the
record like [a] sore [thumb] .... " 453 Pa. at 124, 306 A.2d at 896. Thus the
availability of the claim of double jeopardy to Wideman and his counsel's failure
to raise it were concurrent.
90. See supra text accompanying note 81.
91. This statistic was derived by comparing two LEXIS searches, see
supra note 13, using the following "search requests":
1. (PCHA OR P.C.H.A. OR POST PRE13 CONVICTION) AND (§ 1180)
AND DATE BEF JULY 2, 1973.
2. The "search request," supra, was modified by adding the following
"second level": AND (INEFFECTIVE OR EFFECTIVE OR INCOMPE-
TENT) PRE13 (COUNSEL OR ATTORNEY).
Note: the word "effective" was used in the "search request" to find phrases
such as "lack of effective counsel." All of the cases found by the search were ex-
amined; inappropriate cases were discarded.
92. This statistic was derived by comparing two LEXIS searches identical
to those described supra in note 91, except that the phrase "DATE BEF JULY,
2, 1973" in "search request" number 1 was replaced by "DATE AFT. JULY 2,
1973."
93. 460 Pa. 95, 331 A.2d 435 (1975).
94. Id. at 99-100, 331 A.2d at 437 (1975).
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Clair,95 the Pennsylvania high court's 1974 decision that abolished
the doctrine of "fundamental error""6 in Pennsylvania. In the
post-Clair era, if a trial counsel fails to preserve a significant
issue for review by the direct appeal court, the defendant's only
opportunity for relief lies in the consideration of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim by either a direct-appeal or PCHA
court. 7 However, most of the post-Wideman PCHA appeals
claiming ineffective counsel allege attorney errors that fall out-
side the Clair doctrine. 8 It seems reasonable, then, to conclude
that the Wideman holding has invited many frivolous ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in PCHA petitions.
95. 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974).
96. The doctrine of "basic error" or "fundamental error" allowed an ap-
pellate court to review certain kinds of errors made during a trial even though
they had not been preserved for review by a timely objection. See, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d 301 (1968). See also, Comment,
Pennsylvania Waiver Doctrine in Criminal Proceedings; Its Application and
Relationship to the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim, 15 DUQ. L. REV.
217, 219-23 (1976-77).
97. In his dissent to Clair, Justice Pomeroy predicted an increase in PCHA
petitions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. He wrote:
[t]oday's decision virtually invites more post-conviction hearings, to be
followed by more appeals. As the dissenters in Dilliplaine [v. Lehigh
Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974)] stated: 'A truly
egregious criminal trial error which we decline to consider on appeal
because not preserved below is almost certain to resurface in a post-
conviction proceeding in the form of a charge of ineffectiveness of counsel.
Considerations of judicial economy argue in favor of dealing with errors of
this sort on direct appeal from the judgment of sentence .... ' I continue
to adhere to those views."
458 Pa. at 424, 326 A.2d at 275, (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
98. Clair involves a specific class of mistake made by a defense attorney:
the failure to properly preserve errors made by the judge or the prosecution at
the trial. 458 Pa. at 420, 326 A.2d at 272-73. As the supreme court explained, a
primary justification for requiring that timely objections be made at a trial is to
give the trial judge an opportunity to rectify errors as they occur. Id. 422-23,
376 A.2d at 274. However, a case-by-case analysis of the PCHA appeals alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel that reached the supreme court after Clair
revealed that the majority of the petitioners alleged other kinds of attorney
errors. See, e.g.*, Commonwealth v. Adams, 465 Pa. 314, 350 A.2d 412 (1976)
(allegation that the appellant's trial counsel failed to call two witnesses who
might have rebutted prosecution testimony); Commonwealth v. Townsell, 474
Pa. 563, 379 A.2d 98 (1977) (allegation that the appellant's direct appeal counsel
failed to brief or argue that assistant district attorney had made a manifestly
prejudicial summation at the appellant's trial); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 476
Pa. 83, 381 A.2d 877 (1977) (allegation that the appellant's trial counsel did not
adequately advise him of his rights before recommending a plea of guilty).
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3. Post-Wideman Decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's two subsequent-petition
decisions in the two-year period after Wideman are reminiscept
of its earliest PCHA rulings. Commonwealth v. Via99 and Com-
monwealth v. Yarnal' 0 both reflect a conservative construction
of the PCHA's waiver rule.
In Via, the appellant's second PCHA petition was before the
court. It alleged, inter alia, that both the appellant's court-
appointed trial counsel and his assigned counsel at the first
PCHA hearing were incompetent. 01 The court essentially ig-
nored Via's allegation that his first PCHA counsel was ineffec-
tive, and focused instead on Via's claim of incompetent trial
counsel."' The court stated that a prior counseled PCHA petition
would normally create a waiver of such a claim.'0 3 But the court
noted that both the trial and PCHA attorneys were members of
the same office, and it refused to find that Via had knowingly
and understandingly waived the issue of incompetent trial counsel
in his first PCHA petition.0 4 The court stated that the law will
not assume that an attorney has advised his client of his own in-
adequacies or those of his associates. 5
The Via court did not cite Wideman' 6 anywhere in its opinion,
nor did it attempt to excuse Via's apparent double waiver of his
claim of ineffective trial counsel.' ' The same group of justices
99. 455 Pa. 373, 316 A.2d 895 (1974).
100. 462 Pa. 199, 340 A.2d 431 (1975).
101. 455 Pa. at 376, 316 A.2d at 897. Via had been convicted of burglary in
1968; he made no post-trial motions and filed no direct appeal. He filed his first
PCHA petition in 1968, which was summarily dismissed. Id. at 375, 316 A.2d at
897. Via viled his second PCHA petition in 1970, thus he could not have derived
any "encouragement" from Wideman. See supra text accompanying notes 75-94.
102. 455 Pa. at 377, 316 A.2d at 898. The court made the rather baffling
statement that the "[a]ppellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at
trial and in his first [PCHA] . . . petition are appropriate complaints for col-
lateral review though not raised on direct appeal." Id. Via could not have com-
plained about his PCHA counsel at a direct appeal, had he made one.
103. Id., (citing Commonwealth v. Black, 433 Pa. 150, 249 A.2d 561 (1969)).
See supra note 54.
104. 455 Pa. at 377, 316 A.2d at 898.
105. Id.
106. See supra notes 75-94 and accompanying text.
107. Via had one opportunity to allege incompetent counsel at the direct ap-
peal stage, and another in his first PCHA petition.
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sat on both the Wideman and Via courts.0 8 Presumably, they
could have decided that being counseled by two lawyers from
the same office is an "extraordinary circumstance" that will
justify a failure to allege ineffective counsel at an earlier pro-
ceeding. But the Via court chose, instead, to hold that a waiver
had not occured. °9 A possible explanation is that Via involved an
uncertainty about the independence of counsel-a situation not
unlike Seymour,"10-whereas Wideman involved clear and un-
disputed revelations of incompetence."' If so, this casts a dif-
ferent light on Wideman. The Wideman court may have actually
meant that ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes "extraor-
dinary circumstances ' only when the record contains a clear
showing that prior counsel were ineffective."'
A year later, the same seven justices of the court decided
Commonwealth v. Yarnal. T" In Yarnal, the supreme court affirm-
ed the dismissal of a second PCHA petition that raised, for the
first time, an allegation of ineffective trial counsel."5 With an ap-
parent nod to Via, the court noted that Yarnal had been
represented by different attorneys at his direct appeal and first
PCHA hearing."' The Court stated that no "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" were averred in Yarnal's second petition to explain
why this issue was not raised earlier, then it strictly construed
the PCHA waiver rule to find that he had waived his claim of in-
effective trial counsel."7 The high court's brief opinion did not
cite Wideman, nor did it suggest that Yarnal's allegation merited
a special status.
4. Commonwealth v. Musser: A Preview of the "Monster"
Scarcely six weeks after Yarnal, the Pennsylvania Supreme
108. Chief Justice Jones, and Justices Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy,
Nix, and Mandarino. 455 Pa. at 374, 316 A.2d at 895.
109. 455 Pa. at 377, 316 A.2d at 898.
110. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
113. This interpretation tends to put in perspective the sweeping statement
made by Justice Eagen in Wideman. See supra text accompanying note 83. It
suggests that the Wideman court demanded more than a mere allegation of in-
effective counsel to justify a waiver under the PCHA.
114. 462 Pa. 199, 340 A.2d 431 (1975).
115. Id. at 201, 340 A.2d at 432.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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Court made a dramatic, although apparently short-lived, change
of course in Commonwealth v. Musser,"' The appellant had pre-
viously filed an unsuccessful PCHA petition alleging that his
guilty plea at his trial was involuntary."9 His second petition also
alleged that his guilty plea was involuntary, and further claimed
that the counsel at his first PCHA hearing and subsequent ap-
peal was incompetent." The second PCHA court, seemingly ig-
noring Musser's ineffective-counsel claim, 21 summarily dismissed
the petition on the ground that the voluntariness of his plea had
been finally litigated." 2 The superior court affirmed. 23
The supreme court, in a per curiam opinion, granted allocatur,
and cited Via, Wideman, and Commonwealth v. Murray24 as
authority for its statement that an issue may not be finally liti-
gated or waived in a proceeding in which the defendant has been
denied effective counsel.'25 The supreme court held that the sec-
ond PCHA court should have granted Musser an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether he had been denied effective assis-
tance of counsel at his first PCHA proceedings and remanded
the case to the PCHA court to hold such a hearing.1" The su-
preme court further ordered that if Musser's first PCHA counsel
is found to have been ineffective, Musser should receive a new
evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of his guilty plea."
Musser is puzzling for two reasons: first, because it goes far
beyond the court's previous response to allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel; second, because it encourages abuse of the
PCHA process. Musser seems to graft a new procedure onto the
PCHA-an independent hearing to determine the competence of
118. 463 Pa. 85, 343 A.2d 354 (1975). Yarnal see supra note 114, was decided
on July 7, 1975, Musser on August 18, 1975.
119. 463 Pa. at 87, 343 A.2d at 354.
120. Id. The opinion does not explain whether a single attorney represented
Musser at his first PCHA hearing and subsequent apeal, or whether he had two
different attorneys.
121. According to the supreme court, the second PCHA court acted
"without holding a hearing to determine whether petitioner had the benefit of
competent counsel [at his first PCHA] . . . proceeding." Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 452 Pa. 282, 305 A.2d 33 (1973). In Murray, the supreme court affirmed
the PCHA's dismissal, after an evidentiary hearing, of a first petition that alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel at post-trial motions and at his direct appeal.
125. 463 Pa. at 87, 343 A.2d at 354-55.
126. Id. at 87, 343 A.2d at 355.
127. Id.
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prior PCHA counsel, whenever a subsequent-petitioner alleges
his ineffectiveness.'28 Further, on its face, the decision makes it un-
necessary for a PCHA petitioner to come forward with anything
more than a bare allegation of ineffective counsel." In subsequent-
petition cases heard before Musser, the supreme court had in-
voked the presumption, set down in Washington,10 that counsel
is effective. A claim of ineffectiveness had to be substantiated by
the record or other credible evidence."' Ironically, this point is
strongly made in Murray,"' a decision the Musser court used as
authority for its holding.133 Justice Flaherty's warning in his dis-
sent to Watlington"' can apply equally well to Musser: it too in-
vites an unsuccessful PCHA petitioner to file repetitive petitions
that allege the ineffectiveness of prior counsel. 3'
Despite the changes it seems to bring to PCHA practice, Mus-
ser must be considered an anomoly. It is an almost forgotten
case that, although never overruled, has been generally ignored
by the supreme court. 38 In the five-year period between Musser
128. Specifically, the Musser court stated: "the trial [ie., PCHA] court
should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether, as he alleges,
petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at the [PCHA eviden-
tiary] hearing on the voluntariness of his guilty plea and on the appeal from the
order entered following such hearing." Id. (emphasis added).
129. The Musser court did not point to any item in the record that sug-
gested ineffective representation. Neither did the Court explain how poor per-
formance by Musser's counsel, as measured by the guidelines of Washington,
see supra text accompanying note 60, might have prejudiced Musser's first
PCHA hearing or his subsequent appeal to the superior court.
130. 427 Pa. at 603, 235 A.2d at 352. See supra text accompanying note 60.
When the Washington court discussed the burden of proving ineffective
assistance of counsel, it stated: "[als with other assertions of a denial of con-
stitutional rights in post conviction proceedings, the burden remains . . . with
the prisoner to demonstrate any constitutional deprivation." Id. at 608, 235
A.2d at 354. The supreme court subsequently stated in Murray, see supra note
124, that "there is a presumption counsel is competent." 452 Pa. at 286, 305
A.2d at 36.
131. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex. rel Mullenaux v. Myers, 421 Pa. 61, 66-67
217 A.2d 730, 733 (1966).
132. 452 Pa. at 286, 305 A.2d at 36.
133. 463 Pa. at 87, 343 A.2d at 354-55.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 22 and 23.
135. Under Musser, a subsequent petitioner who merely alleges that his
prior PCHA counsel was ineffective will receive an evidentiary hearing on the
claim. Presumably, an allegation of "layered" attorney incompetence similar to
Watlington's, see supra note 19, would force a hearing that delves deep into the
proceedings against the petitioner.
136. Musser has been cited only three times in majority opinions of the
supreme court, all written in 1976: Commonwealth v. Holmes, 468 Pa. 409, 364
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and Watlington,'37 the court decided two subsequent-petition
PCHA appeals that involved claims of ineffective counsel, neither
of which rely on Musser as authority or can be said to encourage
frivolous PCHA petitions. In Commonwealth v. Padgett," the
court granted further proceedings to a petitioner who had alleged
the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel in three PCHA petitions, '39
but the real issue was whether an attorney helped prepare the
third petition. 4 ' Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Sangricco,4' the
court reaffirmed the principle that the PCHA petitioner is entitled
to be represented by competent counsel during the proceed-
ings.142
A.2d 259 (1976); Commonwealth v. Logan, 468 Pa. 424, 364 A.2d 266 (1976); and
Commonwealth v. Roundtree, 469 Pa. 241, 364 A.2d 1359 (1976). Justice Roberts
cited Musser in his dissent to Commonwealth v. Hubbard, see infra text at
II(B)(5), as authority for the statement that "[aibsent effective assistance of...
[PCHAJ counsel, the issue of ineffectiveness of trial counsel cannot be waived."
472 Pa. 259, 289, 372 A.2d 687, 701 (1977) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
137. Musser was decided on August 18, 1975, Watlington on September 22,
1980.
138. 485 Pa. 386, 402 A.2d 1016 (1979).
139. Padgett looks, at first glance, much like a waiver case. The appellant's
first PCHA petition had alleged ineffective assistance of counsel on three
grounds. These claims were subsequently rejected by the supreme court in
Commonwealth v. Padgett, 465 Pa. 1, 348 A.2d 87 (1975). Padgett's third peti-
tion alleged a new ground; it was summarily dismissed by the PCHA court. 485
Pa. at 388, 402 A.2d at 1017.
140. The supreme court noted that Padgett's third petition was written pro
se. The court stated, "[ajlthough appellant had counsel . . . the record reveals
appointed counsel was attempting to withdraw during the pendency of the pro
se petition. Subsequent to the denial of the petition [by the PCHA court]
without a hearing, appellant's fourth and present counsel was appointed to pro-
cess this appeal." 485 Pa. at 390, 402 A.2d at 1017-18.
141. 490 Pa. 126, 415 A.2d 65 (1980).
142. Sangricco was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and three related
charges in 1974. In 1978 he filed a pro se PCHA petition that alleged, inter alia,
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At that time he requested, and received,
court appointed counsel to assist him. However, the attorney did nothing to
"place appellant's pro se petition in a proper frame or otherwise amend the pro
se allegations." Id. at 129, 415 A.2d at 67. The PCHA court summarily rejected
all but one of the allegations and found that the remaining allegation was insuf-
ficient. The court ordered that the petition be returned to Sangricco for amend-
ment. Id. at 130, 415 A.2d at 67. Despite this leave to amend, the appellant's
court-appointed PCHA counsel took no action. Ten months later, Sangricco filed
a second pro se PCHA petition that alleged, inter alia, a new theory of ineffec-
tive trial counsel, complained about the assistance rendered by appellant's first
PCHA attorney, and made a new request for court-appointed counsel. The
PCHA court did not grant the request for counsel, "apparently concluding that
appellant was still represented by the counsel originally appointed." Id. at 131,
415 A.2d at 67. The PCHA court subsequently summarily dismissed the second
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5. Commonwealth v. Hubbard. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Tackles a Sequential Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Another Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision worth noting in
the post-Wideman, pre-Watlington period is Commonwealth v.
Hubbard."' A 1977 case, Hubbard involved the direct-appeal of a
second-degree murder conviction rather than a PCHA appeal,144
but the decision is significant here because the court conducted a
lengthy analysis of a series of sequential claims of ineffective
counsel. The appellant had been represented by a privately re-
tained attorney at his trial, by a public defender at post-trial
proceedings, and by a second public defender at his direct ap-
peal.Y Hubbard claimed on appeal, inter alia, that his trial
counsel had been ineffective. 1 4 The supreme court rejected these
allegations on the ground that the issue of his trial counsel's inef-
fectiveness had not been properly preserved for appellate re-
view.14'7 The Court explained that a claim of ineffective prior
counsel must be alleged at the "earliest stage in the proceedings
at which the counsel whose effectiveness is being challenged no
longer represents the defendant." 14 '8 This requirement is a corol-
lary to the Dancer rule that requires most claims of ineffective
trial counsel to be made on direct appeal,4 9 and impliedly reaf-
petition, concluding that the old claims in the second petition were finally
litigated, and that the new claim was without merit. Id., 415 A.2d at 67-68. On
appeal, a unanimous supreme court held that the PCHA court "clearly erred"
when it assumed Sangricco was still represented by counsel. The court said,
"[njothing in PCHA practice is more settled than the rule that a person seeking
post-conviction relief is entitled to the assistance of counsel," and remanded the
case for counselled proceedings. Id. at 132, 415 A.2d at 68-69.
143. 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977).
144. Id. at 266, 372 A.2d at 690.
145. Hubbard's privately retained trial counsel withdrew after filing post-
trial motions. A public defender represented appellant throughout the post-trial
proceedings at trial court level and was subsequently replaced by a second
public defender when Hubbard made his direct appeal. Id. at 276, 372 A.2d at
695.
146. Id. Hubbard also claimed that his post-trial counsel was ineffective. See
infra text accompanying note 151.
147. 472 Pa. at 276, 372 A.2d at 695.
148. Id. at 276-77 n.6, 372 A.2d at 695 n.6. The Hubbard court prefaced this
statement by saying, "[wle have recently held that newly appointed or retained
counsel must raise on appeal the ineffectiveness of his predecessor trial counsel
or that claim will be deemed waived." Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Smallwood,
465 Pa. 392, 350 A.2d 822 (1976) (other citations omitted)).
149. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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firms the statement made by the Satchell court some nine years
earlier that Pennsylvania can rest upon the preseumption that
post conviction counsel informed his client of all the available
grounds of attack.1"
The Hubbard court, however, softened its initially conser-
vative approach when it went on to consider, in great detail, the
appellant's additional claim that his post-trial counsel was ineffec-
tive for failing to assign as error the ineffectiveness of his trial
counsel."' To do this, the court was forced to conduct a full
analysis of the trial counsel's performance in light of the ineffec-
tiveness standards set forth in Washington.5 ' The court concluded
that although the attorney did not raise an objection to the pros-
ecutor's arguably prejudicial summation to the jury, his inaction
might have been born of a reasonable, calculated trial strategy,
rather than "sloth and unawareness.'15
Having found that the trial attorney could not be considered
per se ineffective, the supreme court then turned its attention to
the competence of Hubbard's post-trial counsel. The court's
operative question was whether the post-trial counsel in-
vestigated the trial attorney's performance and reasonably con-
cluded that the trial counsel acted in Hubbard's best interests."u
If so, then post-trial counsel was not ineffective; if not, his lack of
diligence constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.'5 The
court could not resolve this issue from the record. It remanded
the case for a hearing on the question of the post-trial attorney's
effectiveness."
The Hubbard majority did not mention Musser,'57 but its deci-
150. See supra text accompanying note 54. This presumption is seemingly
part of the logical foundation beneath the Hubbard court's statement that, "[ilt
follows then that when newly appointed post-trial counsel fails to assign the in-
effectiveness as a ground for post-trial relief, the issue of trial counsel's ineffec-
tiveness is not properly preserved for appellate review." 472 Pa. at 276-77 n.6,
372 A.2d at 695 n.6.
151. Id. at 277, 372 A.2d at 695. The supreme court stated this allegation
could be properly raised in this direct appeal because "this appeal is the first
stage of the proceedings at' which post-trial counsel is no longer representing
appellant." Id. at 277 n.7, 372 A.2d at 695 n.7.
152. See supra text accompanying note 60.
153. 472 Pa. at 285, 372 A.2d at 699.
154. Id. at 285-86, 372 A.2d at 699-700.
155. Id. at 286, 372 A.2d at 700.
156. Id., 372 A.2d at 700.
157. See supra text at section II(B)(4). It should be noted, however, that
Justice Roberts cited Musser in his dissent to Hubbard. See supra note 136.
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sion to remand for a hearing to determine the ineffectiveness of
the appellant's immediately prior counsel has much in common
with the decision of the Musser court.1 58 The Hubbard court,
though, set forth an evaluation standard, specifically whether the
immediately prior counsel investigated the actions of the attorney
that served before him, and whether he reasonably concluded that
the earlier counsel had acted in his client's best interest.159 This
rule of analysis is the key to taming the Watlington "monster.""16
III. THE "MONSTER" BREAKS LOOSE
Commonwealth v. Watlington
In 1972, the appellant in Watlington6 ' was convicted of first-
degree murder. He subsequently appealed his conviction to the
Pennyslvania Supreme Court, alleging that the trial court had
failed to give appropriate cautionary instructions to the jury
regarding the testimony by the co-defendant. 2 The supreme
court affirmed Watlington's conviction, noting that he had
neither made a proper objection during the trial, nor filed post-
verdict motions. 63
In 1979, Watlington filed his first pro se PCHA petition, which
was subsequently amended with the help of court-appointed
counsel. It alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for fail-
ing to file post-verdict motions, for failing to object to un-
specified trial irregularities, and for failing to call witnesses who
could have rebutted aspects of the Commonwealth's case.'" The
PCHA court summarily dismissed the petition on the theory that
Watlington had waived these ineffective assistance issues be-
cause the petition failed to allege the ineffectiveness of his
direct-appeal counsel.1 15 Watlington did not appeal. 66
158. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
159. See supra text accompanying note 154.
160. See supra text at section V.
161. Commonwealth v. Watlington, 491 Pa. 241, 420 A.2d 431 (1980). See
supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
162. 491 Pa. at 242, 420 A.2d at 432.
163. Id. Watlington's direct appeal is reported as Commonwealth v. Wat-
lington, 452 Pa. 524, 306 A.2d 892 (1973).
164. 491 Pa. at 242-43, 420 A.2d at 432.
165. Id. at 243, 420 A.2d at 432.
166. Id.
[Vol. 20:237
Post-Conviction Petitions
Several months later, Watlington filed his second pro se PCHA
petition, this one making new claims for the ineffectiveness of
his trial counsel, and also alleging the ineffectiveness of his
direct-appeal counsel and first PCHA counsel. ' The PCHA court
summarily dismissed Watlington's second petition without ap-
pointing counsel on the grounds that the allegations either were
not recognized under the PCHA or had been finally litigated."8
On appeal, a divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court'69 concluded
that it was dealing with an uncounseled PCHA petition that
alleged issues neither finally litigated nor waived.70 The three-
justice plurality remanded the petition to the PCHA court with
instructions to appoint an attorney to represent Watlington in
"any further proceedings thereon.""' The court did not specify a
particular form of "further proceedings," but presumably they
could range from a summary dismissal of an amended petition
prepared with the aid of counsel to a full evidentiary hearing.
The plurality based its decision on two points: first, that the
specific effectiveness issues Watlington raised in his second peti-
tion were not finally litigated because they had not been raised
on direct appeal or in Watlington's first PCHA petition; second,
that while these new issues could have been raised earlier, Wat-
lington alleged "extraordinary circumstances," i.e., ineffective
assistance of counsel, to justify his failure to raise them.'
The plurality's sole authority for its holding was the Wideman
decision, ' but the opinion does not really explain how the three
justices applied Wideman to the facts in Watlington. The plurality
presented little more than a reaffirmation of the doctrine that
"ineffective assistance of counsel amounts to 'extraordinary cir-
cumstances,' "' along with a passage from Wideman to the ef-
fect that, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to
effective counsel, a defendant is entitled to the assistance of ef-
fective counsel throughout the proceedings against him.' None
167. Id. See supra note 19.
168. 491 Pa. at 243, 420 A.2d at 432-33.
169. See supra note 18.
170. 491 Pa. at 245, 420 A.2d at 433.
171. Id. at 246, 420 A.2d at 434.
172. Id. at 245, 420 A.2d at 433.
173. Id. at 244, 420 A.2d at 433. See supra text at section II(B)(2).
174. 491 Pa. at 244, 420 A.2d at 433. See supra text accompanying note 83.
175. 491 Pa. at 244, 420 A.2d at 433 (citing Wideman, 453, Pa. at 123, 306
A.2d at 896).
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of this provides sufficient rationale for the two conclusions im-
plicit in the plurality holding: first, that the right to effective
counsel can be vindicated by a multiplicity of separate claims,
each alleging a different kind of error by a particular attorney;
second, that these claims are individually immune to the PCHA's
finally-litigated-or-waived rule.'78
As Justice Flaherty argued in his dissent, the Watlington
plurality ignored the teaching of Hubbard that the ineffec-
tiveness of a prior counsel must be raised as an issue at the
earliest stage in the proceedings at which the counsel whose ef-
fectiveness is being challenged no longer represents the defen-
dant. 7 The Hubbard "earliest stage" doctrine, applied to the
facts in Watlington, would have required a holding that issues
related to the competence of Watlington's trial and direct-appeal
attorneys were waived, and that the PCHA court should ex-
amine only the alleged ineffectiveness of Watlington's first
PCHA counsel. The Watlington plurality, however, seemingly
made no distinction among the various "levels" or "stages" of in-
effectiveness claims raised by the appellant.
The "monster" set free by the Watlington plurality is certainly
a procedural beast. Any defendant or attorney creative enough
to think up artificial reasons why prior counsel were ineffective
will surely read the holding as an open-ended invitation to file
repetitive PCHA petitions. In fact, a headnote to Watlington
provides what amount to step-by-step instructions for bypassing
the PCHA's waiver rule.' On the other hand, as Justice Larson
176. See supra text accompanying note 172. The Watlington plurality might
have been well served had it considered the superior court's decision in Com-
monwealth v. Jackson, 239 Pa. Super. 121, 362 A.2d 324 (1976). The Jackson
court allowed a claim of serial ineffectiveness, made in the appellant's second
PCHA petition, of his first PCHA counsel and his direct-appeal counsel, but
found that 10 of the grounds asserted by Jackson were new theories for relief,
and thus had been waived. Id. at 130, 362 A.2d at 331. See also Comment, supra
note 96, at 240.
177. 491 Pa. at 246-47, 420 A.2d at 434, (Flaherty, J., dissenting). See supra
note 148 and accompanying text.
178. The pertinent part of the headnote reads:
"where none of the issues raised in defendant's second [PCHA] . . . peti-
tion were raised in either his direct appeal or his first PCHA petition [i.e.,
they are new issues], and defendant alleged ineffectiveness of all prior
counsel for failing to raise the issues contained in his second petition,
defendant had alleged "extraordinary circumstances" to justify the failure
to raise such issues, and thus the issues were not waived.
491 Pa. at 241-42, 420 A.2d at 431-32.
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commented in his concurring opinion, Watlington's three prior
attorneys were unable to obtain a review, either on direct appeal
or through the PCHA, of Watlington's conviction.' 9 Thus, it
becomes at least plausible that Watlington was burdened with a
series of incompetent counsel and had a fair claim for collateral
relief that extended all the way back to his trial. If so, it can be
said that the Watlington "monster" is not a creature bent on
destruction; it may, in some cases, be a crusader for justice.
IV. TAMING THE WATLINGTON "MONSTER"
A. Justice Flaherty's Two-Pronged Test
In his dissent to Watlington, Justice Flaherty proposed a rule
of analysis for previously waived claims for collateral relief that
are resurrected in an "ineffectiveness context."'8 Specifically, he
urged that such claims be reviewed only when the alleged errors
constitute a denial of due process or of fundamental fairness and
are of a kind that may have affected the truth determining pro-
cess at the petitioner's trial."' In Justice Flaherty's words, inef-
fective assistance of counsel would excuse waiver only if the
waived issue involves "a colorable due process claim significantly
implicating the truth determining process, which, were it unad-
dressed by the court, could have the effect of imprisoning an in-
"1182nocent person.
Justice Flaherty's two-pronged test is effect-oriented. It in-
vites a PCHA court faced with a subsequent petition alleging in-
effective counsel to evaluate the harm that might have been
done to the petitioner's interests by the claimed actions or inac-
tions of his allegedly negligent counsel. Justice Flaherty noted
that the court's interest in subsequent PCHA petitions is to pre-
vent the incarceration of innocent people, not, as in earlier
179. 491 Pa. at 246, 420 A.2d at 434 (Larsen, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 251, 420 A.2d at 436 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). The term "ineffec-
tiveness context" is somewhat misleading. Under Watlington, an allegation of in-
effective counsel prevents a PCHA court from summarily dismissing a collateral
issue that it would probably consider to be waived. The issue is "protected" by
the ineffectiveness claim, but is not submerged within it. Thus, if the petitioner
receives collateral relief, it will be on the basis of the issue, not because he was
represented by ineffective counsel.
181. Id. 420 A.2d at 436, (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 252, 420 A.2d at 437, (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
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stages, to prevent abuses by law enforcement agencies." Impli-
cit in this concept is the idea that a PCHA court should not con-
sider a subsequent petition alleging ineffective counsel where
the petitioner bases his claim for relief on "technicalities," rather
than on his innocence of the crime.'.
Justice Flaherty applied his test to the facts in Watlington as
follows:
Appellant has raised three claims in an ineffectiveness context re-
garding the jury instructions given at his trial, none of which,
even if true, would constitute a due process denial that signif-
icantly implicates the truth determining process at trial. Accord-
ingly, the claims should not be cognizable at PCHA, and the lower
court's dismissal of the petition is proper.'85
Justice Flaherty's conclusion seems highly speculative. How-
ever the jury interpreted the evidence presented at Watlington's
trial, its interpretation was clearly part of the "truth determining
process." The trial court's instructions must be presumed to have
had some effect on the jury's deliberations, although whether or
not the effect was "significant" is a debatable question. Never-
theless, the thrust of Justice Flaherty's argument is clear:
PCHA courts should be free to ignore allegations of attorney er-
rors in subsequent PCHA petitions that merely added another
nail to a tightly nailed down conviction.
B. Commonwealth v. Alexander:
Guidelines for the PCHA Court
The Watlington court's dilemma was not as clear and acute as
the one faced by the Wideman court,'88 but it does reflect the
forces that pull appellate judges in opposite directions when they
decide subsequent-petition PCHA appeals involving ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. At one pole is the need for finality
183. Id. at 251, 420 A.2d at 436-37 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
184. Justice Flaherty cited with approval the following statement from the
concurring and dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Bell in Maroney: "As so fre-
quently happens in recent ... [PCHA] proceedings and appeals therefrom, there
is no doubt of defendant's guilt-indeed, in most of them, defendant relies solely
upon recently created legal technicalities and does not even allege his innocence."
491 Pa. at 252 n.4, 420 A.2d at 437 n.4 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (quoting 427 Pa.
at 614, 235 A.2d at 357).
185. 491 Pa. at 252-53. 420 A.2d at 437 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
186. See supra text accompanying note 82.
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in criminal proceedings 8 ': at the other, the ever-present possibil-
ity that a person may have been improperly convicted because of
the errors made by his attorneys.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed this question at
length in Commonwealth v. Alexander.'" The appellant in Alex-
ander had pleaded guilty to murder in 1954; between 1966 and
1978; he had filed six different PCHA petitions."9 Alexander's
sixth petition-the one before the court-had been summarily
dismissed by the PCHA court on the grounds that all of its
claims had either been finally litigated or waived.190 This petition
alleged, inter alia, that Alexander had been denied effective
assistance of counsel at his first, fourth, and fifth PCHA pro-
ceedings. 9 ' The six justices of the court all concluded that Alex-
ander was not entitled to further relief under the PCHA, but
they could not agree on a common rationale for affirming the
PCHA court's dismissal. Thus, Alexander presents a three-
justice plurality opinion and two concurring opinions, all denying
Alexander's appeal. '92
Justice Larsen, writing for the plurality, quickly determined
that three claims in Alexander's latest petition had been finally
litigated in previous PCHA proceedings.'93 Then he found that
the remaining issues had long been waived by the appellant's fail-
ure to raise them in earlier PCHA petitions, and that Alexander
sought to circumvent the effect of the waiver by alleging the
serial ineffectiveness of three different PCHA attorneys. Justice
Larsen acknowledged that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had,
in previous decisions, spoken in broad terms that suggested that
a mere allegation of ineffective counsel constitutes "extraor-
dinary circumstances" sufficient to justify a waiver under the
PCHA, but he went on to write that applying such an interpreta-
187. For an oft-cited discussion of finality in criminal proceedings, see Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners 76
HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963).
188. 495 Pa. 26, 432 A.2d 182 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes
25-30.
189. 495 Pa. at 27-29, 432 A.2d at 182-83.
190. Id. at 29, 432 A.2d at 183.
191. Id.
192. See supra note 27.
193. 495 Pa. at 32, 432 A.2d at 184.
194. Id. 432 A.2d at 185.
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tion would defeat the intent of the Pennsylvania General As-
sembly. '95
Justice Larsen, however, rejected the two-pronged test pro-
posed in Justice Flaherty's Watlington dissent. While admitting
that it approximated legislative intent more closely than the "inef-
fective assistance equals extraordinary circumstances" formula,
he said that the test's inflexibility was a major drawback. '" He
wrote that the PCHA court, in the exercise of sound discretion,
should be free to consider the myriad of facts and circumstances
surrounding a subsequent petition, and that Justice Flaherty's
two-prong test sets forth only some of the factors for the court's
consideration. 97 Among possible other considerations, Justice Lar-
sen listed the following; (1) the time period between the alleged
error and the filing of the PCHA petition; 98 (2) whether a subse-
quent petition seeks to challenge a guilty plea;'" (3) whether a re-
petitive petition indicates abuse of remedy;200 (4) whether a sub-
sequent petition alleges actual prejudice to the defendant;2 °0 and
(5) whether a subsequent petition merely alleges a different
theory to support an issue already decided against the peti-
tioner.2 0
This list, Justice Larsen noted, is not all-encompassing. Rather,
the PCHA court must consider these and similar factors to gether
with the legal and factual circumstances of the case to determine
whether or not to grant a hearing on a second or successive
PCHA petition.2 3 Further, Justice Larsen wrote, the PCHA
court must always consider the "paramount procedural feature
of the PCHA-that there be only one petition-and its deter-
195. Id.
196. Id. at 34, 432 A.2d at 186. See supra text at section IV(A).
197. 495 Pa. at 36, 432 A.2d at 186.
198. "A lengthy, unexplained delay . . . will buttress the presumption of
knowing and understanding waiver .... " Id. 432 A.2d at 186-87.
199. "The only permissible challenges to a guilty plea are the jurisdiction of
the court, the validity of the plea, and the lawfulness of the sentence." Id. 432
A.2d at 187.
200. "[W]here a petitioner wastes scarce judicial resources by filing
frivolous petitions, he does so at the risk of downgrading the worth of future
petitions. The prisoner who frivolously cries 'error' should not be surprised that
the PCHA court is skeptical about future petitions." Id. at 37, 432 A.2d at 187.
201. "Abstract assertions [of prejudice] will not suffice." Id. at 38, 432 A.2d
at 187.
202. Id. 432 A.2d at 187-88.
203. Id. 432 A.2d at 188.
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mination must give proper deference to the presumption against
multiplicity of post-conviction proceedings."24
Whether the Alexander guidelines can be said to serve a pur-
pose, they are of little use in taming the Watlington "monster."
The number and variety of subsequent-petition PCHA appeals dis-
cussed in this Comment demonstrate that the PCHA courts of
Pennsylvania have long honored the "presumption against multi-
plicity of post-conviction proceedings." and seem willing to follow
the one-petition mandate of the PCHA. It is the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court itself that has insisted that lower courts pay
special attention to the allegations of ineffective counsel.
Justice Nix, in a concurring opinion in Alexander, criticized
the plurality's "lengthy exposition . . . which does more to con-
fuse than to illuminate the factors involved," and concluded that
"an attempt to set forth a list of factors, admittedly incomplete,
served no real purpose."" ° Similarly, Justice Flaherty, in his con-
currence, rejected the guidelines as a "cumbersome list of fac-
tors for the PCHA court to consider in deciding whether to hold
a hearing in a second or successive PCHA petition . . . [that] in-
troduces an unnecessary complexity into the area of the law that
badly needs simplification.""2 '
The five items on Justice Larsen's list, even when taken to-
gether, do not give a PCHA court a rule for evaluating the kinds
of subsequent petitions filed by Watlington or Alexander, be-
cause they do not address the core issue of ineffective assistance
of prior counsel. Further, it is difficult to see how these factors
are on a par, as Justice Larsen suggested,2" ' with the two-
pronged test proposed by Justice Flaherty in his Watlington dis-
sent."8 The Flaherty test would require a PCHA court to ignore
an attorney's negligent waiver of a claim, which, even if true,
doesn't involve a due process denial that significantly implicates
the truth determining process at the trial stage."° By contrast,
the Alexander guidelines seem little more than restatements of
the equitable principles a PCHA court probably applies to every
petition it examines.
204. Id. at 39, 432 A.2d at 188.
205. Id. at 40, 432 A.2d at 188, 189 (Nix, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 41, 432 A.2d at 188 (Flaherty, J., concurring).
207. See supra text accompanying note 197.
208. See supra text at section IV(A).
209. See supra text accompanying note 181.
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V. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSED MODIFICATION TO THE PCHA
The Alexander guidelines"' and the two-step test in Justice
Flaherty's Watlington dissent "' share a common weakness: The
"factors" they present are more at home in appellate chambers
than in a PCHA courtroom. Neither formulation provides an ana-
lytical framework that a PCHA court can use when confronted
by a subsequent PCHA petition that-like those in Watlington
and Alexander-alleges the "layered" ineffectiveness of a series
of prior counsel. 12 Thus, neither is a particularly effective
weapon against the Watlington "monster." The "monster," after
all, is nothing more than a cloud of uncertainty about the
cumulative performances of the various attorneys who had
represented a convicted defendant. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has been reluctant to invoke the PCHA's waiver rule
against a subsequent petitioner whose attorneys may have failed
to recognize a valid collateral issue.
The best way to tame the "monster" is to recognize it for what
it is, and then to build a procedure into the PCHA that forces a
subsequent petitioner to allege the specific attorney errors that
may have prejudiced collateral review of his conviction. The
foundation of such a procedure already exists in the case law of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. It is the Hubbard test: did a
subsequent counsel investigate the actions of the attorney that
served before him, and, if so, did he reasonably conclude that the
prior attorney had acted in his client's best interest?13
The Hubbard test is a logical extension of the attorney effec-
tiveness standard set forth in Maroney, " e.g., the competence of
the subsequent attorney is measured, in part, by whether he made
a reasonable evaluation of the decisions made and actions taken
by the previous attorney. It can be applied to PCHA proceedings
by amending the Act to incorporate the following provisions:
When the PCHA court examines a second or successive petition
for relief that alleges serial ineffective assistance of prior counsel
as an excuse for the waiver of an issue at an earlier proceeding:
1. It shall be presumed that the counsel who served subse-
210. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
211. See supra text at section IV(A).
212. See supra note 19 and text accompanying note 191.
213. See supra text accompanying note 159.
214. See supra text accompanying note 60.
[Vol. 20:237
Post-Conviction Petitions
quent to the challenged attorney made an investigation of
the actions of the challenged attorney."'5
2. The PCHA petitioner bears the burden of overcoming this
presumption. He must allege specific facts which, if proven,
would show:
A. That the subsequent counsel failed to investigate
the actions or inactions of the challenged attorney, or
B. That if such investigation was made, the subse-
quent counsel had no basis to reasonably conclude
that the challegned attorney acted in the best in-
terests of his client.
3. A PCHA court can, at its discretion, resolve these claims of
serial ineffective counsel in a summary proceedings upon
consideration of the record and supporting documents, e.g.,
affidavits filed by the subsequent counsel.
Because the difficulty of inventing allegible facts increases
with each level of claimed attorney incompetence, there is no
need to bar a petitioner from alleging the serial ineffectiveness 6f
a long chain of previous counsel. At the same time, the proposed
provisions should not pose an insurmountable obstacle to the pe-
titioner who can fairly claim he was represented by two, three,
or even more ineffective attorneys. The PCHA court can easily
apply the "patently frivolous" rule1 ' to screen out absurd allega-
tions; yet the court retains complete flexibility to respond to
believable allegations made about any of the petitioner's subse-
quent attorneys, and to take full account of the factors outlined
by Justice Larsen. 17
If the proposed provisions had been in effect when Watlington
filed his second PCHA petition, 8 the PCHA court would have be-
gun its analysis with the rebuttable presumptions that the peti-
tioner's direct appeal counsel and first PCHA counsel were both
effective.219 Thus, Watlington would have been required to allege
215. The "challenged attorney" is the attorney who has been alleged ineffec-
tive. This term has been used to avoid confusion with the "subsequent
counsel"-the attorney presently representing the PCHA petitioner.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
217. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
218. See supra text accompanying note 167; note 19.
219. These two attorneys are the "challenged attorneys" in Watlington.
Their alleged ineffectiveness caused the waiver of the appellant's two claims for-
collateral relief, i.e. (1) that the jury charge at his trial was improper, and (2)
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the charge. See
supra note 19. Under the proposed procedure, the two challenged attorneys will
be presumed "effective" in the sense that both will be presumed to have in-
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specific facts which, if proven, would show:
1. That his first PCHA counsel failed to investigate the
waiver of the claim of ineffective trial counsel by the direct-
appeal attorney,220 or if he did investigate, could not have
reasonably concluded that the direct-appeal attorney had a valid
reason for waiving the claim,' and
2. That his direct appeal counsel failed to investigate the rea-
sons why the trial attorney did not object to the jury instruc-
tions in question,222 or, if he did investigate, could not have rea-
sonably concluded that the trial attorney had a valid reason for
not objecting.223
If Watlington had been unable to allege such facts, his claim
that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the
jury instructions 24 would not reach the threshold level necessary
for consideration by the PCHA court under the proposed rules.226
On the other hand, if Watlington had been able to allege such facts,
the PCHA court could have evaluated the claim without an eviden-
tiary hearing, because the proposed language includes a provision
that expressly empowers a PCHA court to decide claims of serial
attorney ineffectiveness in a summary proceeding." This provi-
vestigated the actions of the attorneys who served before them, and to have
reasonably concluded that the prior attorneys had acted in the best interest of
their client. See proposed rule 1, supra text at section V.
220. This would be required by proposed rule 2(A), supra text at section V,
when applied to Watlington's claim that his direct appeal counsel was ineffec-
tive for failing to allege the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. See supra note
19 and text accompanying note 167.
221. This would be required by proposed rule 2(B), supra text at section V,
when applied to Watlington's claim that his direct appeal counsel was ineffec-
tive for failing to allege the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. See supra note
19 and text accompanying note 167.
222. This would be required by proposed rule 2(A), supra text at section V,
when applied to Watlington's claim that his first PCHA counsel was ineffective
for failing to allege the ineffectiveness of his direct-appeal counsel. See supra
note 19 and text accompanying note 167.
223. This would be required by proposed rule 2(B), supra text at section V,
when applied to Watlington's claim that his first PCHA counsel was ineffective
for failing to allege the ineffectiveness of his direct-appeal counsel. See supra
note 19 and text accompanying note 167.
224. See supra note 19.
225. The allegations would be considered "patently frivolous." See supra
text accompanying notes 32-33, 216.
226. See proposed rule 3, supra text at section V.
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sion is designed to bring these kinds of claims back underneath
the general summary disposition provisions of the PCHA.22 Mus-
ser,"8 Hubbard,2" and to some extent Watlington2" can be read
to suggest that a full-blown evidentiary hearing is required to
resolve claims of serial attorney incompetence.
The author believes that the proposed modifications to the
PCHA would give the PCHA courts of Pennsylvania a filter that
will separate frivolous assertions of ineffective counsel in subse-
quent petitions from valid claims for collateral relief. They will
keep the Watlington "monster" at bay without diminishing the
role of the PCHA as an important safeguard of constitutional
rights.
Ronald Michael Benrey
227. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
228. See generally supra text at section II(B)(4).
229. See generally supra text at section II(B)(5).
230. See generally supra text at section III.
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